For over seven decades, the Kashmir conflict has been viewed as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan—a lingering legacy of partition, nationalism, war, and diplomacy. Yet, beneath this conventional framing lies a third power whose quiet moves have grown louder with time: China. Though Beijing often maintains an official position of neutrality on the Kashmir question, its presence in the region—economically, militarily, and territorially—speaks volumes. As the geopolitics of South Asia shift in the 21st century, it has become increasingly clear that China is no longer a distant observer. It is now a direct stakeholder in the dispute, casting a growing shadow over India–Pakistan relations and adding a new layer of complexity to the path toward peace.

China’s involvement in Kashmir dates back to the early 1960s, when its interest in the region became formally documented with the signing of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement. Under this accord, Pakistan ceded approximately 5,180 square kilometers of the Shaksgam Valley, located in Gilgit-Baltistan, to China. India protested vehemently, labeling the agreement as illegitimate and a violation of its sovereignty. This incident marked the beginning of a deeper Chinese presence in the region, both physically and diplomatically. Over the decades, China’s role has steadily expanded—first quietly, then more overtly through infrastructure projects, military confrontations, and strategic diplomacy.
Today, the territory once known as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is divided among three powers. India controls the regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh. Pakistan administers Gilgit-Baltistan and what it calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir. China occupies Aksai Chin, a high-altitude desert that India claims as part of Ladakh. This three-way territorial control has reshaped the Kashmir issue from a bilateral confrontation to a triangular contest, with each power guarding its portion and watching the others with suspicion and readiness.
China's economic engagement with the region took a decisive turn with the launch of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Valued at over $60 billion, CPEC connects China’s western region of Xinjiang with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. Crucially, a significant stretch of the corridor runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, territory that India considers an integral part of its union. India's objections to CPEC are based not only on sovereignty concerns but also on the geopolitical implications of a strengthened China–Pakistan nexus operating in disputed territory. For China, CPEC is a vital trade and energy corridor; for Pakistan, it is an economic lifeline; for India, it is a strategic threat.
Beyond economics, China’s role has also been growing in terms of military and political engagement. China is Pakistan’s largest arms supplier, providing advanced weapons systems, aircraft, and naval assets. The two nations conduct regular joint military exercises and have strengthened coordination in areas ranging from intelligence to cybersecurity. At international forums, China has frequently come to Pakistan’s diplomatic defense, especially in cases involving terrorism designations and human rights concerns. On multiple occasions, Beijing has blocked India’s attempts to list certain Pakistan-based militants under global terror sanctions at the United Nations. These moves, though subtle, reflect China's commitment to shielding its strategic partner while indirectly undercutting India’s position on Kashmir.
China’s interest in Kashmir is not limited to its alliance with Pakistan. It also stems from its own territorial claims and border tensions with India. Nowhere is this more evident than in the region of Aksai Chin, which China seized from India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war. China continues to hold Aksai Chin and has invested heavily in developing infrastructure, roads, and military bases in the area. For Beijing, Aksai Chin is not just a strategic buffer zone but also a vital land link connecting Tibet to Xinjiang. For India, its loss remains a historical wound and a symbol of Chinese aggression.
In 2020, tensions between India and China escalated sharply when troops from both countries clashed in the Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh. The violent confrontation resulted in casualties on both sides—the first such fatalities in more than four decades. The clash was sparked by Indian efforts to build infrastructure near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which China perceived as a threat to its territorial claims. What followed was a series of military standoffs, the deployment of thousands of troops, and the construction of forward operating bases, bunkers, and surveillance posts. This military build-up has reinforced the reality that the Kashmir region is not just a matter of India–Pakistan rivalry—it is also a site of deepening India–China hostilities.
The rise of China as a direct actor in Kashmir has profound implications. First, it undermines the long-standing belief that Kashmir is a strictly bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Any durable solution must now account for China's territorial claims, strategic interests, and economic stakes. Second, it complicates India’s diplomatic efforts, as the country must now navigate not one but two nuclear-armed adversaries with coordinated interests. Third, it alters the military calculus in the region. With Chinese infrastructure pushing deep into disputed zones and Pakistan’s military benefiting from Chinese technology and training, India faces a twin-front challenge that demands a more comprehensive strategic posture.
Furthermore, China’s actions in Kashmir fit into a broader pattern of geopolitical competition across South Asia. Beijing has increased its influence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and even Bangladesh—countries traditionally seen as within India’s sphere of influence. Many Indian analysts refer to this as China’s “string of pearls” strategy—an attempt to encircle India through a network of economic and military partnerships. Kashmir, therefore, is not an isolated flashpoint but part of a larger chessboard where China seeks to counterbalance Indian power and secure its own strategic depth.
India’s response to this evolving dynamic has been firm but cautious. While it has strengthened military preparedness along the LAC and increased diplomatic engagement with Western powers, especially the United States, it has also tried to avoid a full-scale confrontation with China. At the same time, India remains vigilant of Pakistan’s posturing on Kashmir, especially its use of cross-border terrorism as a tool of state policy. The result is a tense equilibrium, where three nations with overlapping territorial claims and conflicting ambitions coexist in a region that has already suffered too much.
As the third and perhaps most complex stakeholder in Kashmir, China cannot be ignored. Its growing shadow over the region challenges traditional narratives and calls for a rethinking of South Asian security. Peace in Kashmir can no longer be imagined as a product of India–Pakistan dialogue alone. It must also include a strategic assessment of China’s long-term goals, its partnership with Pakistan, and its rivalry with India. Only then can policymakers hope to untangle one of the world’s most dangerous territorial knots.
In the end, Kashmir remains not just a land of disputed borders and contested histories, but also a mirror reflecting the ambitions of three powerful states. As China steps more boldly into the picture, the need for a multilateral approach becomes not just desirable, but inevitable.

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