How East India Company Recast Justice in Colonial India

The Mughal Empire had a highly developed legal system based on royal decrees, administrative conventions, Islamic law, and indigenous custom. Indians were governed by a pluralistic legal regime determined by their social and territorial environments

October 27, 2025 | Daanish Bin Nabi

Colonial Indian legal history traditionally has been overshadowed by the broad narrative of conquest, trade, and political change. But as the reviewed books powerfully illustrate, the law was not simply a passive tool of control -- it was a key player in the production and reproduction of colonial power.
The East India Company (EIC), and subsequently the British Crown, did not merely inherit or impose legal orders; they actually built a colonial juridical landscape that aimed to reconstitute the very essence of legal authority, subjecthood, and sovereignty in India.
This review is based on rich and detailed book titled ‘Islamic Law on Trial Contesting Colonial Power in British India’ (Sanctum Books). Authored by Sohaira Z.M. Siddiqui, it follows the trajectory of colonial legal formations, the limitations placed on Islamic law, and the actions of Muslim legal actors who coped with, contested, and reworked the ground.
The narrative is set in 1608, with the arrival of the first EIC vessels at Surat, a rich Mughal port city and Hajj departure point. Originally one among several European trading firms, the EIC soon saw the strategic importance of Surat and moved for exclusive rights to trade. Sir Thomas Roe, the king's appointed ambassador at the court of the Mughals, negotiated with the Emperor Jahangir to obtain these concessions.
During the reigns of Jahangir and the successor Shah Jahan, the EIC extended its commerce right into the interior of the Mughal empire. By this point, the ambitions of the company were commercial, not judicial.
The Mughal Empire had a highly developed legal system based on royal decrees, administrative conventions, Islamic law, and indigenous custom. Indians were governed by a pluralistic legal regime determined by their social and territorial environments.
The legal powers of the EIC were still limited until the reformed charter of 1661, which enabled it to create courts for English nationals. These courts were primitive—judges received no formal training, and English law was not uniformly practiced.
The jurisdiction of the company was confined to factory towns and English peoples. But the milestone was reached when the Battle of Buxar in 1764 gave the EIC a de facto control over Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.
The Treaty of Allahabad of 1765 institutionalized this transition by giving the EIC the position of diwan, or fiscal head. This added to its power the ability to dispense justice in matters of finance and civil law. Law was now at the heart of colonial rule.
With the extension of EIC territorial rule, the need arose to govern both British subjects and subject Indian peoples. The legal approach of the company was double-barrelled.
First, it applied English legal principles -- centralisation, standardisation, and predictability -- to its new domains.
Second, it recognized the unique religious laws of local populations, especially Islamic law. This twin strategy was expedient: maintaining religious laws legitimized EIC authority and reinforced community distinctions.
Third, integrating Islamic law into the colonial system was especially difficult. The firm attempted to encompass Islamic law within its common-law logic, imposing on it its principles of uniformity and control where the legal tradition was inherently pluralistic and interpretive.
Three constraints were placed upon Islamic law: dependence upon colonial translations of Islamic legal texts, selective use of Islamic rulings in court, and restricted Muslim participation within the legal system. These limits were not evenly imposed under the EIC because of its partial jurisdiction.
But with the Crown's takeover in 1858, more extensive common-law structures came into being, and Islamic law was imposed upon by its logics to a greater extent. However, outright replacement of Islamic law was elusive.
According to legal historian Lauren Benton, the colonial legal order was plural at its core and consisted of various authorities that negotiated and contested jurisdiction. This bred “jurisdictional politics”-- battles over the nature and scope of legal forums and authority.
Muslim legal actors and scholars responded to these limitations in diverse and imaginative manners. Some worked within the colonial legal landscape, while others developed parallel sub-jurisdictions.
The Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i Hadith, and Farangi Mahalli scholars' debates testified to profound concerns regarding legal sovereignty and the legitimacy of colonial courts. Shah Abdul Aziz, Mufti Kifayatullah Dihlawi, Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli, and Ahmad Reza Khan initiated prolonged criticism of colonial legal rule. They responded with theological argumentation as well as practical legal mobilisation.
In the colonial legal ground, Muslim legal actors managed to exert agency. Maulvi Mahomed Yusoof, who studied at a madrasa and subsequently at the English bar, emerged as a leading advocate at the Calcutta High Court.
He was the first Muslim to be asked to give the distinguished Tagore Law Lectures and used the opportunity to set right long-standing misconceptions in colonial interpretations of Islamic law.
In like manner, Maulvi Samee-Ullah Khan Bahadur, trained mufti and district judge, also criticized both colonial and Muslim perceptions of Islamic law. His judicial differences with Syed Mahmood and Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman demonstrate the conflicted nature of legal thinking in the colonial paradigm.
The comparative case of Parsi legal culture, examined by Mitra Sharafi, provides additional insight. Parsis, whose law was never recognized as a separate system, employed colonial legal tools to construct autonomous institutions and substantive law. Their "legalism" set the precedent for other groups, including Muslims, to follow suit with identical tactics of legal mobilisation.
Muslim legal agents wrote legislation, sought legal education overseas, sat on the judiciary, and wrote treatises -- following Parsi patterns and illustrating the ordering power of the colonial legal landscape.
One of the strongest limitations on Islamic law was dependency on colonial translations. Upon becoming diwan, the EIC initiated a judicial reorganisation in 1772, acknowledging the Muslim community's entitlement to Islamic law but subjecting adjudication to company courts. Native law officers were merely advisers.
In an effort to decrease dependence on such officers, the EIC ordered translations of principal Islamic texts into English, establishing the Anglo-Muhammadan legal canon.
Such translations were filled with mistakes and were disparaged by Muslim legal agents. Al-Haj Mahomed Ullah, grandson of Maulvi Samee-Ullah, wrote six works to counter colonial distortions, such as a detailed family code of law and a historical critique of Islamic law's evolution under colonialism.
In conclusion, Islamic law in colonial India was not a straightforward tale of oppression. It was a multifaceted contest between colonial power and local legal traditions, informed by constraints, contestations, and innovative responses. The legal landscape of the colonies was not a single, monolithic entity—it was multicentric, plural, and highly political.
The books examined here present a richly detailed and nuanced description of this landscape, placing at centre stage the constitution of law as both instrument of empire and location of resistance.
‘Islamic Law on Trial Contesting Colonial Power in British India’ is a necessity for scholars, students, and readers concerned with the intersection of law, colonialism, and religious authority.