India's diplomatic engagements with Bangladesh political class used to be normal and one of equi-distance. In fact, around 2017 -18 as well; whenever Indian leaders say the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister visited Dhaka; the Indian leaders held meeting with the leaders of opposition party BNP and also the ruling side including the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

"We do engage with all the sections of the Bangladeshi political spectrum," -- was normal Indian refrain.
In fact, Dhaka had also remained concerned that the diplomatic equilibrium was not disturbed. In 2018, the Indian establishment took a rather ‘proactive interest’ in standing alongside Bangladesh (then under Hasina) when it disallowed entry of BNP leader Khaleda Zia's British lawyer Lord Alexander Carlile into India.
"Indian government's decision to deport BNP lawyer Lord Carlile was a decision in the right direction," then a BJP leader had said in Delhi. India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh also visited Dhaka and it in probability underlined India's appreciation of the fact that once "fundamentalist and pro-Pakistan forces" gain upper hand and can dethrone Sheikh Hasina, the anti-India forces could again find toehold in that country.
Dhaka had also reportedly conveyed to the Indian minister that "in line with its zero-tolerance policy against terrorism and violent extremism, Bangladesh doesn't allow its territory to be used by any terrorist individual, group and entity against any state or people". For his part, Rajnath Singh also tweeted saying: "Had an extremely fruitful meeting with the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka. We discussed a range of bilateral and regional issues of mutual interest".
India and Bangladesh had actually made notable progress in transforming "our land and maritime boundaries into zones of peace and tranquillity". Rajnath also said before leaving for Dhaka -- "Looking forward to strengthen the bilateral relations between both the countries on the basis of friendship and trust". "The relationship between India and Bangladesh is anchored in history, culture, language and shared values of democracy. India attaches great significance to ties with Bangladesh," he had said.
But since August 2024; India and Bangladesh ties came under strain due to several factors, including diplomatic friction over the interim government and the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and she taking shelter in India. Moreover, there have been trade restrictions imposed by both sides, and unresolved issues like border disputes and river water-sharing.
The geopolitical shift with China's growing influence in Bangladesh and a rise in anti-India sentiment further complicate the relationship.
However, many believe, Bangladesh's interim government, under Yunus, has seen a burst of diplomatic outreach aimed at "de-Indianising" Bangladesh's foreign policy, according to political scientist Bian Sai in a paper published by the National University of Singapore.
In stark contrast, as they say - Bangladesh’s ties with Pakistan and China witnessed significant "improvement". The Yunus regime's domestic handling of the Hindu minority further strained relations. The arrest, asset freezing and sentencing of prominent Hindu leader Krishna Das Prabhu sparked strong protests from the Modi government. Dhaka also has slowed the progress of the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal transport agreement, prioritising domestic interests and exploring partnerships with other third parties.
According to the paper from Bian Sai ... "India’s self-identification as a ‘global leader’ in South Asia and globally has heightened Bangladesh’s perception of it as a threat. The legacy of the 1971 Liberation War continues to shape Bangladesh’s view that India interferes in its domestic affairs. Bangladesh perceives India’s protector mentality as undermining its sovereignty and independence."
A recent survey by the Dhaka-based Centre for Alternatives found more than 75% of Bangladeshis viewed ties with Beijing positively, compared with just 11% for Delhi.
The feeling that India-Bangladesh ties improved dramatically under Hasina is slightly exaggerated. The fact is economic and cultural ties often endure beyond political shifts: data show that trade between India and Bangladesh grew between 2001 and 2006, when the "less friendlier" Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), was in power.
In Delhi, it was Vajpayee regime till 2004 and then Manmohan Singh had taken over.
In 2025 ... India is too anxious about the possible outcome in Bangladesh if elections are held by February 2026 -- as has been pledged by the Yunus regime.
Bangladesh is just not a fallen ally. As a neighbour, Bangladesh is central to India's dealings with border management and also "access" to its restive north-eastern region. The Yunus regime understands India's dilemma and challenges. It has tried to enhance economic and military ties with China ostensibly to offset Indian influence in the region.
This is where India is worried and needs to walk cautiously. In the past; numerous northeast militant groups run by Nagas, Assamese youths such as ULFA and insurgents from Tripura, Mizoram and Meghalaya have taken shelter in Bangladesh. They would also from time to time receive training in guerrilla warfare from Bangladeshi and Pakistan's ISI officers.
Since August 2024; the Yunus regime in Dhaka has been building up their Defence forces on an urgent level. Airfields were being renovated and in this context by March–April 2025, Bangladesh's interim government initiated the "revival of the World War II-era" Lalmonirhat airbase, located near the India-Bangladesh border.
They have been also Building up the fleet with Chinese assistance. The Yunus regime has been doing enough for enhancing Pakistani foot prints
Among others, Lt Gen Tabassum Habib met Dhaka officials and reportedly focused on professional military education and institutional defence links.
Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza with ISI representatives met Chief Adviser Yunus and also service chiefs to discuss about intelligence sharing and defence cooperation.
However, there are gaps India can wait for its turn the table. The deep-seated historical grievances and so-called 'Bengali' nationalistic sentiments between Bangladesh and Pakistan present opportunities for India to work on. Moreover, Bangladesh’s structural dependence on India is unlikely to vanish or bring in any fundamental shift.
Thus New Delhi needs to wait for its geo-strategic turn. It will have to work closely with key political stakeholders in Dhaka -including the armed forces.

Email:-------------------------nirendelhi@gmail.com