BREAKING NEWS
An Enduring Treaty?
Concluded in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty [IWT] has a unique record of having successfully endured the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak conflicts as well as the 1999 Kargil War, which is indeed remarkable. It’s largely believed that this is because of two reasons. One, the treaty ensures equitable distribution of water, and two, both New Delhi and Islamabad have been accommodative while dealing with IWT related issues.
However, these assumptions are unfortunately far removed from reality.
While water distribution under IWT is shockingly disproportionate, tensions over interpretation of IWT provisions between India and Pakistan are more of a rule rather than an exception. Upper riparian states can exploit their ability to control water flow by dictating terms to lower riparian states. However, in the Indo-Pak context it’s the other way round with Pakistan adopting an obstructionist approach.
National Security Advisory Board member and Former Chairman, Bhakra Beas Management Board DK Sharma has aptly summed up the situation by noting that “It is also a fact that no upper riparian State has been subjected to such draconian provisions regarding the construction of unsustainable dams, including numerous restrictions on their operation and maintenance.”
Water Allocation
Under the IWT, water from the six rivers flowing from India to Pakistan has been sub-allocated for exclusive use-the three Eastern rivers [Sutlej, Ravi and Beas] to India, and the three Western rivers [Indus, Jhelum and Chenab] to Pakistan. In physical terms, this amounts to India getting approximately only 33 million acre feet [MAF] water [19.64 percent] while Pakistan gets 135 million [MAF] or 80.36 percent.
According to a study, India would have qualified for getting access to at least 42.8 percent share of the waters of the Indus basin if the sub-allotment was not based on mathematical distribution of water basins rather than quantifiable criterion of population, drainage area and state of cultivated lands.
Post the signing of IWT, the alarming disparity in water allocation came under severe criticism in India. This issue was also raised in the Parliament, not only by opposition parties but even members of the ruling Congress party. On November 30, 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru informed the parliament that “[through IWT], we purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries.”
It thus emerges that rather than use water as a weapon, the then prime minister of India agreed to give more than 80 percent of Indus basin water to Pakistan to promote amity. In hindsight, one may condemn this decision as a humongous blunder, but then, Nehru did so in good faith. And had Pakistan realised the value of this magnanimous award and chosen the path of peace, it wouldn’t have been in the terrible mess that it is in today.
Financial Contributions
Since diversion of waters from the Western rivers allocated to Pakistan under IWT entailed substantial developmental work, providing financial assistance to Islamabad is understandable. Similarly, since India is a much larger country, asking it to pay much more than Islamabad is also reasonable. However, what stands out is that the share of payment was inordinately disproportionate.
As against India’s contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 to IBDF, Pakistan paid only Pounds Sterling 440,000. The irony is that despite India’s significant monetary contribution, while its Beas Project was not financed from IBDF, IWT decreed that “The cost of the works in Pakistan will be financed out of the Indus Basin Development Fund.”
That a major part of IWT hydel projects in Pakistan have been created by India’s monetary contribution is something that Islamabad never mentions, leave alone acknowledge.
Rawalpindi’s Role
Pakistan’s greatest misfortune is that the military has directly or indirectly been ruling the country ever since its creation. Resultantly, rather than creating dams and hydel projects to save water allocated to it from flowing into the Arabian Sea, Islamabad was arm-twisted to finance Rawalpindi’s massive investment in fighter jets, tanks and foreign made military hardware. Resultantly, Pakistan today has has a capacity to store only a measly 10 percent of the water it receives under IWT.
To save face, as well as divert public attention from its own failings, Islamabad invariably blames India. According to Uma Sekhar, Advisor [International Law] at Indian Council of World Affairs [ICWA] that out of 71 IWT related projects proposed by India, Pakistan has objected to more than 52 of them, a clear indication of Islamabad’s obstructionist approach. She opines, “We will see in the coming time, and which we are already seeing… that Pakistan is going to keep a narrative of victimhood and aggression at the same time.”
Though not directly blamed, Rawalpindi is yet well aware of how its lopsided priorities and puerile attempt to compete militarily with India has precipitated Pakistan’s water crisis, and this explains its aggressive [and immensely hilarious] rhetoric on this issue.
Remember self-promoted Field Marshal Asim Munir’s side-splitting “We will wait for India to build a dam, and when it does so, phir 10 missiles se faarigh kar dengey [we will destroy it with 10 missiles]” threat? Or his media chief’s Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry’s equally laughable “Agar tum hamara pani bandh kar doge, toh hum tumhari saans band kar denge [if you stop our water, we will stop your breath" warning?
Self Created Crisis
Islamabad may cite IWT abeyance as a decision having “grave implications for regional peace and security, as well as serious humanitarian consequences.” However, since India hasn’t stopped the flow of water over which Pakistan has exclusive rights, Pakistan’s protest is just a case of crying “wolf.” Pakistan’s real problem is not the quantity of water it is receiving but its woefully inadequate water storage facility, and the world knows this.
Pakistan needs to be reminded that its citizens are victims of institutional apathy, as precious little has been done on the water availability augmentation front.
Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services document titled Water Scarcity and Wastage in Pakistan released in September 2024 reveals that while India formulated its first water policy in 1978, Pakistan did so only in 2018 –40 years after India, and while India has created a 190 days water storage capacity, Pakistan only has a capacity to store water for 30 days
Is ‘Abeyance’ Tenable?
There have been differing views on the legal tenability of New Delhi’s decision to hold IWT in abeyance. While ‘legal eagles’ may debate this issue ad nauseam, common sense and basic logic suggests that any treaty and agreement that subverts national interests and public welfare needs to be re-evaluated, irrespective of whether such a clause exists in the treaty/agreement.
A convincing explanation has been given by Nishant Sirohi, a Law and Society Fellow at Transitions Research. He maintains that “India has not withdrawn from the treaty; nor has it diverted water flows or breached allocation quotas... Rather, India has temporarily suspended procedural cooperation, i.e. participation in dispute resolution forums, joint mechanisms, and routine diplomatic engagements tied to treaty operation.
According to Sirohi, holding IWT in abeyance “is not abandonment; it is a calibrated form of legal restraint, undertaken in the face of a long-standing, unaddressed wrongful state-sponsored act of terrorism that strikes at the core of trust on which the IWT was premised.” He logically concludes that “In sum, India’s invocation of ‘abeyance’ is not a rejection of its international obligations, but a strategic legal signal-a reminder that treaty regimes are not immune to geopolitical realities, and that credibility and reciprocity are indispensable to their endurance.
The Way Ahead
India’s Former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore, TCA Raghavan notes that “From the 70s and up till the late 90s there was something which we used to term as called the Salal Mindset. And the Salal Mindset was that let's try to keep any India-Pakistan riparian difference away from the dispute resolution mechanisms. Let the Indus Commissioners handle it and if a compromise requires that you [India] concede a little more than is required, then you do so.”
The Tulbul Navigation Project [also known as the Wullar Barrage] is an example of the Salal Mindset. Readers would recall that in 1987, India unilaterally accepted Pakistan’s request of an indefinite suspension until an amicable settlement could be reached- something that never happened despite several rounds of bilateral talks, thanks to Islamabad’s brazen obduracy.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to revive this project last year is a step in the right direction since it conveys the unambiguous signal to Islamabad that the Salal Mindset is now a thing of the past.
IWT’s preamble mentions that it has been concluded “in a spirit of goodwill and friendship,” and since Pakistan has not its obligations in this regards, New Delhi’s decision to hold IWT in abeyance is an unmistakable sign of India’s assertive approach that gives India an opportunity to exercise its basic right of ensuring that its water storage capacity is not degraded due to Pakistan’s motivated objection to de-silting of reservoirs and allied activities that are permissible under IWT.
Unbelievable as it may sound, the fact is that due to objections from Pakistan, the Salal reservoir hasn’t been dredged since 1978 due to objections from Islamabad to the very fundamental and inescapable requirement of opening under-sluice gates for efficient de-silting.
A May 2025 bathymetric survey has revealed that due to this unreasonable restriction imposed by Pakistan, the Salal reservoir has lost nearly 96 percent of its original storage capacity of 284 million cubic meters [MCM] falling down to just 9.91 MCM. By disregarding Islamabad’s irrational objections and opening the permanently plugged under-sluice gates as part of a major de-silting drive demonstrates that New Delhi will henceforth not sacrifice national interests on the altar of political expediency.
Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses [MPIDSA] reveals that though India has been given 3.6 MAF on Western rivers under IWT, in the last 65 years it has only utilised 0.6 MAF. As such he considers IWT being put in abeyance as an opportunity to “complete the projects which we are already in the pipeline.” Achieving this may be a long drawn affair but as ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu had said, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
Email:------------nileshkunwar56@gmail.com
An Enduring Treaty?
Concluded in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty [IWT] has a unique record of having successfully endured the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak conflicts as well as the 1999 Kargil War, which is indeed remarkable. It’s largely believed that this is because of two reasons. One, the treaty ensures equitable distribution of water, and two, both New Delhi and Islamabad have been accommodative while dealing with IWT related issues.
However, these assumptions are unfortunately far removed from reality.
While water distribution under IWT is shockingly disproportionate, tensions over interpretation of IWT provisions between India and Pakistan are more of a rule rather than an exception. Upper riparian states can exploit their ability to control water flow by dictating terms to lower riparian states. However, in the Indo-Pak context it’s the other way round with Pakistan adopting an obstructionist approach.
National Security Advisory Board member and Former Chairman, Bhakra Beas Management Board DK Sharma has aptly summed up the situation by noting that “It is also a fact that no upper riparian State has been subjected to such draconian provisions regarding the construction of unsustainable dams, including numerous restrictions on their operation and maintenance.”
Water Allocation
Under the IWT, water from the six rivers flowing from India to Pakistan has been sub-allocated for exclusive use-the three Eastern rivers [Sutlej, Ravi and Beas] to India, and the three Western rivers [Indus, Jhelum and Chenab] to Pakistan. In physical terms, this amounts to India getting approximately only 33 million acre feet [MAF] water [19.64 percent] while Pakistan gets 135 million [MAF] or 80.36 percent.
According to a study, India would have qualified for getting access to at least 42.8 percent share of the waters of the Indus basin if the sub-allotment was not based on mathematical distribution of water basins rather than quantifiable criterion of population, drainage area and state of cultivated lands.
Post the signing of IWT, the alarming disparity in water allocation came under severe criticism in India. This issue was also raised in the Parliament, not only by opposition parties but even members of the ruling Congress party. On November 30, 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru informed the parliament that “[through IWT], we purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries.”
It thus emerges that rather than use water as a weapon, the then prime minister of India agreed to give more than 80 percent of Indus basin water to Pakistan to promote amity. In hindsight, one may condemn this decision as a humongous blunder, but then, Nehru did so in good faith. And had Pakistan realised the value of this magnanimous award and chosen the path of peace, it wouldn’t have been in the terrible mess that it is in today.
Financial Contributions
Since diversion of waters from the Western rivers allocated to Pakistan under IWT entailed substantial developmental work, providing financial assistance to Islamabad is understandable. Similarly, since India is a much larger country, asking it to pay much more than Islamabad is also reasonable. However, what stands out is that the share of payment was inordinately disproportionate.
As against India’s contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 to IBDF, Pakistan paid only Pounds Sterling 440,000. The irony is that despite India’s significant monetary contribution, while its Beas Project was not financed from IBDF, IWT decreed that “The cost of the works in Pakistan will be financed out of the Indus Basin Development Fund.”
That a major part of IWT hydel projects in Pakistan have been created by India’s monetary contribution is something that Islamabad never mentions, leave alone acknowledge.
Rawalpindi’s Role
Pakistan’s greatest misfortune is that the military has directly or indirectly been ruling the country ever since its creation. Resultantly, rather than creating dams and hydel projects to save water allocated to it from flowing into the Arabian Sea, Islamabad was arm-twisted to finance Rawalpindi’s massive investment in fighter jets, tanks and foreign made military hardware. Resultantly, Pakistan today has has a capacity to store only a measly 10 percent of the water it receives under IWT.
To save face, as well as divert public attention from its own failings, Islamabad invariably blames India. According to Uma Sekhar, Advisor [International Law] at Indian Council of World Affairs [ICWA] that out of 71 IWT related projects proposed by India, Pakistan has objected to more than 52 of them, a clear indication of Islamabad’s obstructionist approach. She opines, “We will see in the coming time, and which we are already seeing… that Pakistan is going to keep a narrative of victimhood and aggression at the same time.”
Though not directly blamed, Rawalpindi is yet well aware of how its lopsided priorities and puerile attempt to compete militarily with India has precipitated Pakistan’s water crisis, and this explains its aggressive [and immensely hilarious] rhetoric on this issue.
Remember self-promoted Field Marshal Asim Munir’s side-splitting “We will wait for India to build a dam, and when it does so, phir 10 missiles se faarigh kar dengey [we will destroy it with 10 missiles]” threat? Or his media chief’s Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry’s equally laughable “Agar tum hamara pani bandh kar doge, toh hum tumhari saans band kar denge [if you stop our water, we will stop your breath" warning?
Self Created Crisis
Islamabad may cite IWT abeyance as a decision having “grave implications for regional peace and security, as well as serious humanitarian consequences.” However, since India hasn’t stopped the flow of water over which Pakistan has exclusive rights, Pakistan’s protest is just a case of crying “wolf.” Pakistan’s real problem is not the quantity of water it is receiving but its woefully inadequate water storage facility, and the world knows this.
Pakistan needs to be reminded that its citizens are victims of institutional apathy, as precious little has been done on the water availability augmentation front.
Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services document titled Water Scarcity and Wastage in Pakistan released in September 2024 reveals that while India formulated its first water policy in 1978, Pakistan did so only in 2018 –40 years after India, and while India has created a 190 days water storage capacity, Pakistan only has a capacity to store water for 30 days
Is ‘Abeyance’ Tenable?
There have been differing views on the legal tenability of New Delhi’s decision to hold IWT in abeyance. While ‘legal eagles’ may debate this issue ad nauseam, common sense and basic logic suggests that any treaty and agreement that subverts national interests and public welfare needs to be re-evaluated, irrespective of whether such a clause exists in the treaty/agreement.
A convincing explanation has been given by Nishant Sirohi, a Law and Society Fellow at Transitions Research. He maintains that “India has not withdrawn from the treaty; nor has it diverted water flows or breached allocation quotas... Rather, India has temporarily suspended procedural cooperation, i.e. participation in dispute resolution forums, joint mechanisms, and routine diplomatic engagements tied to treaty operation.
According to Sirohi, holding IWT in abeyance “is not abandonment; it is a calibrated form of legal restraint, undertaken in the face of a long-standing, unaddressed wrongful state-sponsored act of terrorism that strikes at the core of trust on which the IWT was premised.” He logically concludes that “In sum, India’s invocation of ‘abeyance’ is not a rejection of its international obligations, but a strategic legal signal-a reminder that treaty regimes are not immune to geopolitical realities, and that credibility and reciprocity are indispensable to their endurance.
The Way Ahead
India’s Former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore, TCA Raghavan notes that “From the 70s and up till the late 90s there was something which we used to term as called the Salal Mindset. And the Salal Mindset was that let's try to keep any India-Pakistan riparian difference away from the dispute resolution mechanisms. Let the Indus Commissioners handle it and if a compromise requires that you [India] concede a little more than is required, then you do so.”
The Tulbul Navigation Project [also known as the Wullar Barrage] is an example of the Salal Mindset. Readers would recall that in 1987, India unilaterally accepted Pakistan’s request of an indefinite suspension until an amicable settlement could be reached- something that never happened despite several rounds of bilateral talks, thanks to Islamabad’s brazen obduracy.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to revive this project last year is a step in the right direction since it conveys the unambiguous signal to Islamabad that the Salal Mindset is now a thing of the past.
IWT’s preamble mentions that it has been concluded “in a spirit of goodwill and friendship,” and since Pakistan has not its obligations in this regards, New Delhi’s decision to hold IWT in abeyance is an unmistakable sign of India’s assertive approach that gives India an opportunity to exercise its basic right of ensuring that its water storage capacity is not degraded due to Pakistan’s motivated objection to de-silting of reservoirs and allied activities that are permissible under IWT.
Unbelievable as it may sound, the fact is that due to objections from Pakistan, the Salal reservoir hasn’t been dredged since 1978 due to objections from Islamabad to the very fundamental and inescapable requirement of opening under-sluice gates for efficient de-silting.
A May 2025 bathymetric survey has revealed that due to this unreasonable restriction imposed by Pakistan, the Salal reservoir has lost nearly 96 percent of its original storage capacity of 284 million cubic meters [MCM] falling down to just 9.91 MCM. By disregarding Islamabad’s irrational objections and opening the permanently plugged under-sluice gates as part of a major de-silting drive demonstrates that New Delhi will henceforth not sacrifice national interests on the altar of political expediency.
Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses [MPIDSA] reveals that though India has been given 3.6 MAF on Western rivers under IWT, in the last 65 years it has only utilised 0.6 MAF. As such he considers IWT being put in abeyance as an opportunity to “complete the projects which we are already in the pipeline.” Achieving this may be a long drawn affair but as ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu had said, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
Email:------------nileshkunwar56@gmail.com
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