The geopolitical landscape of South Asia has entered a phase of subtle but significant transformation. At the center of this shift is an emerging pattern of strategic alignment between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—a triangle that places India at the center, geographically and geopolitically. While this formation is not a formal alliance, the growing confluence of interests and cooperation between these three countries—particularly under the influence of an assertive China—has raised alarm bells in New Delhi. The idea of being ‘encircled’ is no longer a mere theory; it is becoming a discernible structure in South Asian diplomacy, trade, military cooperation, and regional connectivity.
Historically, South Asia has been dominated by India in terms of geography, demography, economy, and political clout. However, over the last two decades, China has emerged as a powerful actor in the region, challenging India's traditional dominance. Beijing has employed a combination of economic incentives, infrastructure investment, and strategic diplomacy to penetrate the neighborhood surrounding India. Pakistan has been a time-tested ally of China, but the realignment now includes growing Chinese influence in Bangladesh—a country with deep historical and cultural ties to India. As the ties among these three countries deepen, Indian strategists find themselves confronted with the possibility of a slow yet steady encirclement strategy.
The China–Pakistan axis is the most visible and consolidated leg of this triangle. The friendship between these two nations is often described as “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” While such expressions are metaphorical, the depth of their strategic cooperation is very real. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at over $60 billion, is the centerpiece of this alliance. Stretching from China’s western region of Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea, CPEC not only serves as a crucial route for Chinese energy and trade but also gives Beijing direct access to the Indian Ocean. What makes this even more problematic for India is that CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a territory that India considers part of its sovereign domain.
China’s investment in Pakistan is not limited to infrastructure. It is also Pakistan’s largest arms supplier. From advanced drones and fighter aircraft to surface-to-air missile systems, China has fortified Pakistan’s defense capabilities. The two nations regularly conduct joint military exercises and collaborate on counter-terrorism operations. In international forums such as the United Nations, China has repeatedly blocked attempts to sanction Pakistan-based terror leaders, shielding Islamabad from global pressure.
What is equally important is the ideological and strategic alignment between China and Pakistan. Both countries share concerns about India’s rise as a regional power and seek to balance or counter its influence. While Pakistan views India through the lens of historical rivalry and territorial dispute over Kashmir, China perceives India as a regional competitor, especially after India's growing alignment with the West through forums like the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) involving the US, Japan, and Australia.
The increasing closeness between China and Bangladesh is a more recent but no less important development. Bangladesh’s relationship with China has largely been economic, but it has gradually acquired strategic undertones. China is currently Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and has extended billions of dollars in loans and grants for infrastructure development. Key projects include the Padma Bridge, roads, power plants, and special economic zones. These investments have transformed Bangladesh’s physical and economic landscape, offering opportunities for rapid development.
China has also made its way into Bangladesh’s defense sector. It has sold submarines, warships, and missile systems to Dhaka, making it one of the major suppliers of military hardware to the country. The strategic implications of this are significant. While Bangladesh has repeatedly clarified that its relations with China are based on economic cooperation, and not at the expense of India, the presence of Chinese military equipment and expertise on Indian borders cannot be overlooked.
India and Bangladesh have historically enjoyed strong ties, grounded in the shared struggle of 1971 when India supported Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan. In recent years, this relationship has strengthened under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The two countries have cooperated on issues ranging from border management to terrorism, and India has extended credit lines and development assistance to Bangladesh. However, unresolved issues such as the Teesta river water sharing agreement and perceptions of political interference occasionally create friction.
What makes Bangladesh’s position in this triangle unique is its pragmatic diplomacy. Unlike Pakistan, which has openly aligned with China, Bangladesh has maintained a balance. It has welcomed Chinese investment while keeping its traditional ties with India intact. Dhaka has often emphasized that its foreign policy is based on national interest and regional cooperation, not on choosing sides. Yet, the increasing dependence on Chinese funding, coupled with growing defense ties, puts Bangladesh in a position where future governments may find it difficult to resist Chinese strategic pressure.
The third leg of this triangle, the Pakistan–Bangladesh relationship, has historically been fraught with mistrust and resentment due to the events of 1971. For decades, diplomatic ties between the two were minimal. However, in recent years, there have been attempts at cautious normalization. Pakistan has expressed interest in improving trade and people-to-people ties with Bangladesh, and some limited diplomatic engagements have occurred. While a full rapprochement remains unlikely in the near future, even a functional relationship could complement China's larger strategic vision in South Asia by subtly binding these nations through common economic and diplomatic platforms.
From India’s perspective, this evolving triangle presents a complex challenge. The concern is not merely military encirclement but the erosion of India’s historical influence in its immediate neighborhood. China’s capacity to provide quick infrastructure funding, with fewer political conditions than Western countries or India, makes it an attractive partner for developing nations like Pakistan and Bangladesh. This has led to a reconfiguration of regional loyalties and partnerships.
India’s response has been both reactive and proactive. New Delhi has re-emphasized its “Neighborhood First” policy and expanded its “Act East” policy to include economic and strategic cooperation with ASEAN countries. India has also invested heavily in regional connectivity projects, such as the India-Bangladesh rail and road networks, and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project connecting the Northeast with Myanmar. Additionally, India is deepening defense partnerships with like-minded countries including the US, Japan, Australia, and France, which are all concerned about China’s growing assertiveness.
India must also focus on the soft power dimension. Its shared history, cultural affinity, and democratic values make it a natural partner for countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. However, these ties need to be actively nurtured. Issues such as religious tensions, cross-border migration, and economic inequality must be addressed with sensitivity and clarity to prevent them from being exploited by external actors.
One of the key takeaways from this triangular development is that India’s strategic space is being tested not by military confrontation but by diplomacy and development. China’s use of economic statecraft—offering loans, building infrastructure, and expanding trade—is reshaping the strategic map of South Asia. This is a new form of geopolitical competition that cannot be countered by military means alone. India must develop a more flexible, responsive, and inclusive foreign policy that can offer credible alternatives to its neighbors.
It would be simplistic to view the China–Pakistan–Bangladesh triangle as a direct military threat or an anti-India axis. Each leg of the triangle has its own motivations. Pakistan seeks to counter India and offset its economic failures through Chinese support. Bangladesh aims for rapid development and greater global integration. China desires regional dominance and economic access. However, when these motives converge in a way that sidelines India, the strategic consequences are real.
India must not fall into the trap of isolationism or coercive diplomacy. Instead, it must double down on its strengths—its democratic values, economic potential, scientific achievements, and civilizational links. As the largest and most stable democracy in the region, India has a unique role to play in leading by example. It must be proactive, not reactive; cooperative, not confrontational.
In conclusion, the rise of a China–Pakistan–Bangladesh triangle is a reflection of shifting power balances in South Asia. For India, this development is both a challenge and an opportunity. It challenges India to rethink its regional strategy, rebuild trust with its neighbors, and assert itself as a benevolent leader. At the same time, it offers the opportunity to redefine regional cooperation on India’s terms—anchored in mutual respect, shared prosperity, and peaceful coexistence. Encirclement is not inevitable, but it can become real if India fails to act decisively and diplomatically.

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