BREAKING NEWS
Unanswered Questions
So much has been said and written about Operation Sindoor that one is hesitant to add yet another piece to the rapidly burgeoning plethora of views. However, even though several erudite personalities have dispassionately dissected this four-day-long military standoff, conflicting expositions [including some that are perceptibly motivated] coupled with Pakistani propaganda has created a certain amount of ambiguity/scepticism in the minds of many.
Some of the questions that seem to bother Indians are:
Why was Operation Sindoor terminated so early?
Did India agree to a premature ceasefire under pressure from Washington?
Why didn’t New Delhi use this opportunity to recapture Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir [PoJK]?
Will Operation Sindoor prevent Pakistan from orchestrating terrorist attacks in J&K?
Did India and Pakistan lose any military assets during this operation?
In this operation, who has emerged as the victor?
Hence even at the cost of being accused of flogging a dead horse, it would be worthwhile to holistically evaluate Operation Sindoor so that the wood isn’t missed for the trees.
Understanding Operation Sindoor
In its media release of May 7, Press Bureau of Information [PIB], the Indian government’s nodal agency for disseminating information to the print and electronic media, had stated that “a little while ago, the Indian Armed Forces launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, hitting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed.”
Clarifying that nine sites had been targeted, the press release revealed that through this operation, India was “living up to the commitment” that those responsible for the April 22 Pahalgam attack in J&K will be held accountable.” Explicating that “no Pakistani military facilities have been targeted,” the PIB release clarified that the Indian action was “focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature.”
From New Delhi’s statement issued shortly after the initial strike against terrorist infrastructure, it clearly emerges that Operation Sindoor was strictly a punitive action involving incapacitation of terrorist infrastructure to serve as a deterrent, and not an act of retributive justice that focuses solely on the deservedness of punishment.
Was Operation Sindoor Terminated so Early?
By near simultaneous targeting of nine major terrorist facilities [four belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad or JeM, three belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT and two of Hizbul Mujahideen or HM] during the initial strike itself, New Delhi clearly sent out the intended message to the terrorist leadership as well as their handlers.
By eliminating several terrorists [including many top terrorist commanders] who were occupying the facilities targeted by the Indian armed forces on the night of May 7/8, the objective of Operation Sindoor was achieved and hence, continuing to attack terrorist infrastructure made no sense as terrorists would have vacated these facilities and taken refuge elsewhere immediately after the first strike.
Accordingly, when the Pakistan army Director General of Military Operations [DGMO] spoke to his Indian counterpart on May 10 and requested cessation of hostilities, New Delhi agreed to the same as the planners of the Pahalgam massacre had already been dealt a heavy blow.
Was Ceasefire Brokered by the US?
It was US President Donald Trump’s pretentious claims of his involvement that fuelled suspicions that New Delhi was arm-twisted by Washington into agreeing to end hostilities. Even though he was subsequently forced to publicly admit that he or his administration had played no role whatsoever in brokering the ceasefire, opposition political parties in India found Trump’s initial boast a handy stick to beat the government.
Washington definitely must have helped both India and Pakistan in reaching an understanding, but its involvement could not be said to tantamount brokering a ceasefire. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's blunt clarification that “our response is not over-it is only paused” clearly indicates that India decided to cease hostilities on its terms and thereby asserted its strategic autonomy.
Recapturing PoJK
As mentioned earlier, Operation Sindoor was a punitive military operation against anti-India terrorist groups based in Pakistan as well as PoJK and this is why the Indian armed forces did not attack any military facility in Pakistan/PoJK. However, when Rawalpindi decided to target India’s defence facilities and its civilian population, the Indian armed forces took appropriate action to degrade the offensive capability of Pakistani armed forces to target Indian military assets and civilian areas.
So, it was Rawalpindi’s precipitative reaction that enlarged the scope of Operation Sindoor and the targeting of Pakistani defence assets by the Indian armed forces were in effect just a set of proactive defensive measures against the high probability of escalation by a miffed adversary.
Though New Delhi strongly maintains that reintegration of PoJK with J&K is a national responsibility that needs to be fulfilled, unlike Pakistan whose army chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir talks about fighting ten wars for Kashmir, India has never considered using the military option for this purpose.
Most importantly, since “selection and maintenance of aim” is the fundamental principle of military strategy, shifting gears and converting a limited “non-escalatory” military action into a full blown war without requisite preparation would prove suicidal. Wars can’t be waged just on whims and fancies!
Furthermore, considering the inviolability of the Line of Control [LoC] in J&K, the international community wouldn’t approve of any military actions that result in its realignment. In 1999, the world univocally rejected the Pakistan army’s intrusions across the LoC in the Kargil sector of J&K, and so how can one expect the international community to sit back and silently watch India retake PoJK?
Will Operation Sindoor Prevent Pakistan Sponsored Terrorist Activities in J&K?
Since Rawalpindi has been sponsoring terrorist activities in J&K for more than three-and-a-half decades, it’s very difficult to say for certain whether Operation Sindoor will have a salutary effect on Rawalpindi. However, Modi’s stern warning that "for every terror attack on India, Pakistan's army and economy will have to pay the price” may act as a meaningful deterrent.
If this doesn’t, then his declaration that "Pakistan will not get a single drop of water that belongs to India and saying that “This is India's resolve and no one in the world can deter us from this commitment," will definitely impose a fair amount of caution on Rawalpindi and keep terrorist activities in J&K at a low key.
Nevertheless, since J&K remains an ideological and emotive issue for Pakistan, targeting terrorist infrastructure or military targets cannot be expected to fully rid this menace. Moreover, given Rawalpindi's proclivity for recklessly invoking the Kashmir issue, New Delhi has no option but to enlarge the scope of punitive action beyond military action, and holding the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance as a deterrent is a step in the right direction.
Loss of Military Assets
Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani defence spokespersons have admitted any loss of major defence assets during this conflagration, but both have claimed to have inflicted substantial losses on each other. While the adverse psychological fallout due to revelation of one’s losses may influence truthful disclosure, in military terms, what’s of consequence is successful attainment of the mission/goal and not the cost at which the same is achieved.
Pakistan has made stupendous claims but failed to provide any credible evidence in support. India has been more conservative on this issue but satellite photos and recovery of downed aerial vehicles do indicate substantial damage to Pakistani defence assets. However, since material losses are recoupable, other than providing an ego massage, comparative statistics of losses inflicted/suffered mean little.
The Victor
Mission accomplishment is the paramount indicator of how opposing sides have fared, and as such identifying the victor is not very difficult. The Indian armed forces were assigned the initial mission of targeting high value terrorist facilities and subsequently degrade the offensive capabilities of the Pakistan armed forces.
Satellite imagery and video footage of terrorist infrastructures and defence assets attacked show precision targeting resulting in extensive damage. Admissions that several senior LeT, JeM and HM cadres had been killed in these strikes bear irrefutable testimony to the fact that the Indian armed forces successfully accomplished their initial and subsequent missions.
The opposite holds true for Pakistan. Despite being equipped with sophisticated surveillance, early warning and interception equipment, leave alone engaging and destroying missiles and rockets fired from the Indian side before they hit their targets, the Pakistan armed forces failed to even detect the barrage of incoming missiles.
The extensive damage caused to Nur Khan air base which is at a stone’s throw from Pakistan army’s General Headquarters is perhaps the Pakistani armed forces most glaring failure was its inability to ensure security of this high value air base. [For the unversed, this air base serves as the headquarters of Pakistan’s Air Mobility Command and plays a key role in logistics, VIP transport, and strategic operations].
So, in a scenario wherein precision guided munitions fired by an attacker successfully inflict the desired degree of punishment on assigned targets in enemy territory while the defender fails to accomplish his basic mission of detecting and intercepting hostile projectiles despite having an elaborate air defence setup, it only requires just a bit of commonsense and not rocket science to determine who the winner is!
Email:------------------------------nileshkunwar.56@gmail.com
Unanswered Questions
So much has been said and written about Operation Sindoor that one is hesitant to add yet another piece to the rapidly burgeoning plethora of views. However, even though several erudite personalities have dispassionately dissected this four-day-long military standoff, conflicting expositions [including some that are perceptibly motivated] coupled with Pakistani propaganda has created a certain amount of ambiguity/scepticism in the minds of many.
Some of the questions that seem to bother Indians are:
Why was Operation Sindoor terminated so early?
Did India agree to a premature ceasefire under pressure from Washington?
Why didn’t New Delhi use this opportunity to recapture Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir [PoJK]?
Will Operation Sindoor prevent Pakistan from orchestrating terrorist attacks in J&K?
Did India and Pakistan lose any military assets during this operation?
In this operation, who has emerged as the victor?
Hence even at the cost of being accused of flogging a dead horse, it would be worthwhile to holistically evaluate Operation Sindoor so that the wood isn’t missed for the trees.
Understanding Operation Sindoor
In its media release of May 7, Press Bureau of Information [PIB], the Indian government’s nodal agency for disseminating information to the print and electronic media, had stated that “a little while ago, the Indian Armed Forces launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, hitting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed.”
Clarifying that nine sites had been targeted, the press release revealed that through this operation, India was “living up to the commitment” that those responsible for the April 22 Pahalgam attack in J&K will be held accountable.” Explicating that “no Pakistani military facilities have been targeted,” the PIB release clarified that the Indian action was “focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature.”
From New Delhi’s statement issued shortly after the initial strike against terrorist infrastructure, it clearly emerges that Operation Sindoor was strictly a punitive action involving incapacitation of terrorist infrastructure to serve as a deterrent, and not an act of retributive justice that focuses solely on the deservedness of punishment.
Was Operation Sindoor Terminated so Early?
By near simultaneous targeting of nine major terrorist facilities [four belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad or JeM, three belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT and two of Hizbul Mujahideen or HM] during the initial strike itself, New Delhi clearly sent out the intended message to the terrorist leadership as well as their handlers.
By eliminating several terrorists [including many top terrorist commanders] who were occupying the facilities targeted by the Indian armed forces on the night of May 7/8, the objective of Operation Sindoor was achieved and hence, continuing to attack terrorist infrastructure made no sense as terrorists would have vacated these facilities and taken refuge elsewhere immediately after the first strike.
Accordingly, when the Pakistan army Director General of Military Operations [DGMO] spoke to his Indian counterpart on May 10 and requested cessation of hostilities, New Delhi agreed to the same as the planners of the Pahalgam massacre had already been dealt a heavy blow.
Was Ceasefire Brokered by the US?
It was US President Donald Trump’s pretentious claims of his involvement that fuelled suspicions that New Delhi was arm-twisted by Washington into agreeing to end hostilities. Even though he was subsequently forced to publicly admit that he or his administration had played no role whatsoever in brokering the ceasefire, opposition political parties in India found Trump’s initial boast a handy stick to beat the government.
Washington definitely must have helped both India and Pakistan in reaching an understanding, but its involvement could not be said to tantamount brokering a ceasefire. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's blunt clarification that “our response is not over-it is only paused” clearly indicates that India decided to cease hostilities on its terms and thereby asserted its strategic autonomy.
Recapturing PoJK
As mentioned earlier, Operation Sindoor was a punitive military operation against anti-India terrorist groups based in Pakistan as well as PoJK and this is why the Indian armed forces did not attack any military facility in Pakistan/PoJK. However, when Rawalpindi decided to target India’s defence facilities and its civilian population, the Indian armed forces took appropriate action to degrade the offensive capability of Pakistani armed forces to target Indian military assets and civilian areas.
So, it was Rawalpindi’s precipitative reaction that enlarged the scope of Operation Sindoor and the targeting of Pakistani defence assets by the Indian armed forces were in effect just a set of proactive defensive measures against the high probability of escalation by a miffed adversary.
Though New Delhi strongly maintains that reintegration of PoJK with J&K is a national responsibility that needs to be fulfilled, unlike Pakistan whose army chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir talks about fighting ten wars for Kashmir, India has never considered using the military option for this purpose.
Most importantly, since “selection and maintenance of aim” is the fundamental principle of military strategy, shifting gears and converting a limited “non-escalatory” military action into a full blown war without requisite preparation would prove suicidal. Wars can’t be waged just on whims and fancies!
Furthermore, considering the inviolability of the Line of Control [LoC] in J&K, the international community wouldn’t approve of any military actions that result in its realignment. In 1999, the world univocally rejected the Pakistan army’s intrusions across the LoC in the Kargil sector of J&K, and so how can one expect the international community to sit back and silently watch India retake PoJK?
Will Operation Sindoor Prevent Pakistan Sponsored Terrorist Activities in J&K?
Since Rawalpindi has been sponsoring terrorist activities in J&K for more than three-and-a-half decades, it’s very difficult to say for certain whether Operation Sindoor will have a salutary effect on Rawalpindi. However, Modi’s stern warning that "for every terror attack on India, Pakistan's army and economy will have to pay the price” may act as a meaningful deterrent.
If this doesn’t, then his declaration that "Pakistan will not get a single drop of water that belongs to India and saying that “This is India's resolve and no one in the world can deter us from this commitment," will definitely impose a fair amount of caution on Rawalpindi and keep terrorist activities in J&K at a low key.
Nevertheless, since J&K remains an ideological and emotive issue for Pakistan, targeting terrorist infrastructure or military targets cannot be expected to fully rid this menace. Moreover, given Rawalpindi's proclivity for recklessly invoking the Kashmir issue, New Delhi has no option but to enlarge the scope of punitive action beyond military action, and holding the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance as a deterrent is a step in the right direction.
Loss of Military Assets
Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani defence spokespersons have admitted any loss of major defence assets during this conflagration, but both have claimed to have inflicted substantial losses on each other. While the adverse psychological fallout due to revelation of one’s losses may influence truthful disclosure, in military terms, what’s of consequence is successful attainment of the mission/goal and not the cost at which the same is achieved.
Pakistan has made stupendous claims but failed to provide any credible evidence in support. India has been more conservative on this issue but satellite photos and recovery of downed aerial vehicles do indicate substantial damage to Pakistani defence assets. However, since material losses are recoupable, other than providing an ego massage, comparative statistics of losses inflicted/suffered mean little.
The Victor
Mission accomplishment is the paramount indicator of how opposing sides have fared, and as such identifying the victor is not very difficult. The Indian armed forces were assigned the initial mission of targeting high value terrorist facilities and subsequently degrade the offensive capabilities of the Pakistan armed forces.
Satellite imagery and video footage of terrorist infrastructures and defence assets attacked show precision targeting resulting in extensive damage. Admissions that several senior LeT, JeM and HM cadres had been killed in these strikes bear irrefutable testimony to the fact that the Indian armed forces successfully accomplished their initial and subsequent missions.
The opposite holds true for Pakistan. Despite being equipped with sophisticated surveillance, early warning and interception equipment, leave alone engaging and destroying missiles and rockets fired from the Indian side before they hit their targets, the Pakistan armed forces failed to even detect the barrage of incoming missiles.
The extensive damage caused to Nur Khan air base which is at a stone’s throw from Pakistan army’s General Headquarters is perhaps the Pakistani armed forces most glaring failure was its inability to ensure security of this high value air base. [For the unversed, this air base serves as the headquarters of Pakistan’s Air Mobility Command and plays a key role in logistics, VIP transport, and strategic operations].
So, in a scenario wherein precision guided munitions fired by an attacker successfully inflict the desired degree of punishment on assigned targets in enemy territory while the defender fails to accomplish his basic mission of detecting and intercepting hostile projectiles despite having an elaborate air defence setup, it only requires just a bit of commonsense and not rocket science to determine who the winner is!
Email:------------------------------nileshkunwar.56@gmail.com
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