As Gilgit-Baltistan prepares to vote in the June 7 local assembly elections, the region is once again witnessing a systematic manipulation of its political landscape. It is evidenced by the intimidation of opposition voices and state power deployment to engineer an electoral outcome even before a single ballot is going to be cast. Ahead of this weekend’s polling, Pakistani authorities have arrested dozens of mainstream political leaders affiliated with jailed former prime minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). These detentions fit into a broader pattern that has been a norm in Pakistan’s electoral history, which has particularly become more visible since Mr. Khan’s ouster in 2022 with state institutions being blatantly used to constrain political competition and marginalize opponents.
According to local media reports, among those detained were PTI’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) president Junaid Akbar and prominent regional figures including Saleem Rehman, Syed Mehboob Shah, Dr. Amjad Ali and Naeem Khan, who were reportedly taken into custody while campaigning in Hunza. The PTI national leadership has condemned these actions with its KP Chief Minister Sohail Afridi decrying that “those whose job is to protect the public mandate always cast a shadow on the mandate” of the people of Pakistan. “By not providing a level playing field in the elections and by forcibly, through oppression and coercion, subtracting Imran Khan Sahib's party, the democratic system is being destroyed,” Afridi said, vowing that “we will not allow Gilgit-Baltistan to become a no-go area.”
In Gilgit-Baltistan, such tactics carry a deeper significance as the region has long occupied a distinct place in Pakistan’s political architecture. It has been governed without full constitutional rights, denied genuine autonomy and subjected to an electoral system whose outcomes have reflected, howsoever briefly in last one and half decade, the preferences of Islamabad and Rawalpindi rather than the aspirations of local voters. These latest arrests therefore do not signify any isolated episode of political repression but a reminder of how elections in Gilgit-Baltistan have often functioned as mechanisms for legitimizing decisions already made elsewhere than as instruments of democratic representation.
Gilgit-Baltistan, part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir which acceded to India in 1947, has been administered by Pakistani after occupying parts of the state during the first Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-48. But, unlike other provinces of Pakistan, mountainous region has never enjoyed full constitutional status within the Pakistani federation. For decades, Islamabad governed the region through bureaucratic fiat. While the area was administered through a colonial-style political agent system until 1970s, the subsequent establishment of the Northern Areas Council by Zulfikar Ali Bhuttoo, which merely changed the name of Political Agents to Resident Commissioner as the real authority remained concentrated in federal hands under its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.
The much-publicized Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 was presented as a democratic breakthrough as it created a legislative assembly and a chief minister’s office, which ostensibly granted GB residents a greater voice in governance. The reforms however stopped well short of meaningful self-rule as key powers continued to reside with federally appointed officials while Kashmir Affairs Ministry retained decisive influence over policymaking, budgeting and administration.
The result has been an unusual political arrangement where an elected government exists but without the authority normatively associated with democratic institutions. As such, within this framework, elections have merely served as exercises in political management. Over the years, a particular pattern has emerged when it comes to both GB and other part of POJK wherein whichever party runs the façade of civilian government in Islamabad under the tutelage of military establishment almost invariably goes on to secure mandate in Gilgit. For instance, when Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was in power during the first GB elections of 2009, it emerged victorious in Gilgit-Baltistan whereas during the second election in 2015 when Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) ruled nationally, it too secured electoral dominance in the region. The same story repeated itself in 2020 when PTI, then ruling in power in Islamabad and seen close to military establishment, won the local elections and formed the government in Gilgit.
Such a consistency has often been presented by Pakistani authorities as evidence of political alignment between the region and the federal government. But for critics, they see a political system which has been structured in such a way that genuine electoral competition becomes secondary to the preferences of the military establishment. Consequently, the current election cycle appears to be following the same script as shown by the crackdown on PTI and instead of allowing voters to determine the party’s fate through the ballot box, authorities have chosen to restrict its ability to campaign effectively.
These coercive measures are not occurring in isolation. Across Pakistan, PTI leaders and activists faced arrests, prosecutions and administrative obstacles since the violent events of May 9, 2023, which increased ahead of 2024 general election. Yet, what distinguishes Gilgit-Baltistan is the vulnerability of its political institutions given the region lacks constitutional protections which could shield its local political processes from federal intervention.
This imbalance creates fertile ground for manipulation as the coercive apparatus of the state from law enforcement agencies to administrative authorities can be deployed with relatively little oversight. While opposition parties face obstacles in organizing rallies, mobilizing supporters and conducting campaigns, the pro-establishment ones such as PML-N and PPP are enjoying a smooth sailing in the absence of a credible opposition.
The irony of this evolving situation is hard to miss as Pakistan regularly accuses India of denying Kashmiris democratic rights and political freedoms and yet works overtime to controls levers of piecemeal democratic activities in PoJK including Gilgit-Baltistan. As such, as voters head to the polls on June 7, the central question who not be who will win as its brief electoral history suggests that answer may already be known. The more important question is whether the people of GB will ever be allowed to participate in an electoral process whose outcome is determined solely by their own choices.