Criticism is vital in any democracy. It refines policy, exposes abuse, and holds power to account. But when critique turns into caricature—ignoring ground realities and the real beneficiaries—it risks silencing voices that matter. Susan McLoughlin’s recent article “Goodwill as Bad Faith”, published by the Kashmir Law & Justice Project, presents Operation Sadbhavana (literally “goodwill”) largely as a symbolic, militarised façade. While criticism is warranted, painting Sadbhavana as mere showmanship fails to accord with the available evidence and lived experience across Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The truth is more complex: Sadbhavana has its flaws, but to dismiss its long‐term welfare, educational, and developmental impacts is to ignore substantial gains, tangible lives changed, and persistent gaps still to address.
This essay will set out:
Origins and doctrine of Operation Sadbhavana
Documented achievements (education, health, infrastructure, social inclusion)
Critiques and challenges—where Sadbhavana falls short
A balanced assessment: what works, what still needs reform
Conclusion: why critique should neither blind us to progress nor excuse failures.
Origins and Doctrine of Operation Sadbhavana
Operation Sadbhavana was launched in 1998 by the Indian Army in J&K, at the height of armed insurgency and terrorism. The state’s civil governance and service delivery systems were severely compromised: many schools were damaged, health infrastructure was weak or inaccessible in conflict zones, and local administration was unable to reach large swathes of the territory safely. In this vacuum, the Army stepped in with a doctrine: that people are the “centre of gravity” in counter‐insurgency. Security operations cannot stand apart from welfare, development, and trust‐building.
Thus, the goals of Sadbhavana have been to:
Rebuild or repair schools, ensure access to basic education
Provide healthcare through medical camps and periodic clinics
Improve infrastructure—roads, water supply, electricity—in remote / conflict affected areas
Promote livelihoods, skills, women’s empowerment, sports and culture
Foster civil‐military relations – reduce fear, increase trust
This combination of physical security plus “hearts and minds” effort seeks not just to suppress insurgency but to address root grievances: lack of opportunity, neglect, marginalization.
Documented Achievements
While the claims made in the critique under review may sometimes exceed what can be supported by fully verifiable sources, there is substantial evidence that Sadbhavana has delivered real benefits. I outline a number of domains, with documented data where possible.
Education
Army Goodwill Schools (AGS): These are among the most visible parts of Sadbhavana’s educational outreach.
Number of schools: There are 43 Army Goodwill Schools in Jammu & Kashmir.
Student numbers and staffing: Around 15,000 students are enrolled in AGSs; approximately 1,000 teaching and non teaching staff employed.
Quality Outcomes
In some years, AGSs have achieved 100% pass in CBSE Class 10 exams.
In remote districts like Kupwara, AGSs continue to maintain high pass percentages in board exams, top rankings in schools, distinctions.
Higher / specialist exam support: The “Super” coaching projects (e.g. “Kashmir Super 50 (Engg)”, “Super 30 (Med)” type) have helped students from weaker socio economic backgrounds gain admission to engineering / medical colleges.
Digital learning
Digital library / iPrep tablet interventions in AGSs: For instance, in 10 AGSs more than 5,000 students and 200 teachers have benefited via digital content, offline preloaded learning through tablets, etc.
Smart classrooms in schools like Dras: Upgrading infrastructure via interactive panels, smartboards, etc., to reduce remoteness disadvantage.
These reflect that education access, quality, and outcomes have meaningfully improved, especially for remote and conflict affected areas.
Health, welfare, and social inclusion
While quantitative data is harder to find in publicly accessible sources for some of the claims (e.g. exact number of medical camps, infant mortality over the period, etc.), there is evidence of health interventions and outreach:
Medical and veterinary camps have been periodically organized under Sadbhavana in many areas. This helps both human health and livestock health in rural/agricultural communities. (Though verifying exact figures would require internal or government reports.)
Women’s empowerment: AGSs and associated community outreach have included supporting Self Help Groups (SHGs), vocational training for women in tailoring, sewing, entrepreneurship. For example, local civil society articles note increasing participation of women in Shopian and other districts in these programs.
Infrastructure, connectivity, empowerment of remote areas
AGSs in remote and border districts have often been built in otherwise underserved areas, thereby improving not only educational access but also triggering ancillary infrastructure improvements—roads, electric supply, better communication / security around schools.
Sustainability initiatives: In some cases, AGS have signed MoUs with philanthropic or other external foundations for better funding and financial sustainability, which helps reduce over reliance on defence budgets alone. E.g., an MoU for financial support of AGSs in Baramulla and Kupwara was signed.
Measurable outcomes at the Union Territory level: literacy
While attributing all improvements in literacy or health to Sadbhavana would be simplistic, aggregate data suggests upward trends:
As of 2025, Jammu & Kashmir’s literacy rate for population aged 7 and above has been noted in government statements to be ≈ 82%, above the national average (~80.9%).
Earlier, in rural areas and districts more affected by conflict, literacy had lagged considerably, but improvements over time are visible in reports and anecdotal education performance in AGSs.
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Critiques & Challenges
Acknowledging the achievements does not absolve Sadbhavana of shortcomings. These are real, and merit critical reflection.
3.1 Limitations in scale, coverage, and equity
Even though AGSs cover many remote areas, there remain regions and communities—particularly tribal, nomadic, or transhumant populations (e.g. Gujjars & Bakarwals)—where literacy and access remain low. Educational status for these groups shows much lower literacy rates historically.
Disparities in outcomes between urban and rural sectors persist. In many rural or high security or conflict affected zones, infrastructure, teacher availability, retention, and school upkeep remain problematic.
Attribution and causality
Many of the more ambitious claims (e.g. large declines in infant mortality, huge rises in clean water access) are harder to validate or trace directly to Sadbhavana—or to distinguish from other governmental, NGO, and privatized interventions. Without transparent data sources, such numbers risk being inflated or unverified.
Possible over-reliance on “militarised welfare”
Critics raise the concern that welfare tied to military presence might blur lines between civilian and military roles, possibly reinforcing power imbalances, dependency, or perceptions of coercion in conflict zones.
Also, in some contexts, SAD benefits may be subject to bureaucratic delays, uneven delivery, or be less accessible to certain groups due to logistical, social, or political barriers.
Instances of alleged mismanagement, excessive force, or insensitivity to local culture have been documented and are real. Ignoring them does not strengthen the case for Sadbhavana but weakens it.
For long term trust, institutions must not only build but also respond to grievances—this includes transparency, oversight, public accountability. Some critics allege that “goodwill” can become a cover for soft power without sufficient oversight of the military’s larger role in security operations.
Balanced assessment: What works and what needs reform
Given the achievements and the challenges, how should one assess Sadbhavana? And what reforms or recalibration might make it better?
What works
Education access has improved: AGSs have brought schooling into far flung valleys and border zones where few other actors are willing or able to invest continually. The outcomes—such as high exam pass rates—suggest the standard of teaching and infrastructure in many of these schools is better than local average in comparable areas.
Skill development and women’s inclusion: In multiple districts, programs that train women in livelihood skills (tailoring, entrepreneurship), enable small trades, create self help groups – these are concrete, bottom up changes with long term benefit.
Infrastructure & connectivity: Schools themselves often become nuclei for broader improvements—roads, electricity, water, even better security arrangements.
Community trust & symbolic change: In conflict zones, where the Army has previously been viewed only as an external force, having a welfare oriented, service providing dimension creates opportunities for civil military engagement that can soften mistrust. Oral histories, local testimony often speak of students or families who “once avoided AGS” now endorsing it. (As quoted in media voices, e.g. LG‐statements.)
What needs reform / deeper investment
Data transparency & independent evaluation: Many claims rest on Army or government sources. More independent studies — by academia, NGOs, research institutions — should examine outcomes (literacy, health, economic mobility) with control groups. For example, matching villages with and without strong Sadbhavana presence to see difference in indicators over time.
Equity in reach: Special attention must be given to marginalized groups: nomadic, tribal, women, remote high altitude districts. AGSs do much, but their density and resource allocation vary.
Sustainability and financial independence: MoUs with external foundations, philanthropic support are helpful, but to avoid dependence, local community participation, local ownership, budgetary provisions, possibly public private partnerships must be broadened.
Integration with broader civil governance: For Sadbhavana to be more than “Army welfare”, there must be close coordination with civil government, local Panchayats, health and education departments. When AGSs exist, but local school boards or districts don’t match in standard, gaps persist.
Grievance redressal & oversight: Military roles in conflict zones are complex. There must be systems to handle complaints, oversight by civilian bodies or independent commissions, public reporting of failures or misappropriations.
Rebutting “Goodwill as Bad Faith”
In her article, McLoughlin argues that Sadbhavana is a “façade” that masks the militarisation of welfare and that the goodwill is bad faith. On several counts, this assertion overreaches. Below I lay out key rebuttals.
Ignoring Lived Voices and Beneficiaries
The article does not sufficiently engage with the voices of students, families, communities who have benefitted directly from AGSs, vocational training, medical camps, or livelihood schemes. Anecdotes are not data, but systematic neglect of testimony leads to a skewed picture. There are numerous local news reports, statements by officials, media coverage documenting instances of tens of thousands of students achieving exams, families having access to medical care, women being economically empowered. To treat all this as propaganda is dismissive.
5.2 Selective use of data or absence thereof
Critics often focus on failures — which are real — but by doing so they imply that successes either are negligible or do not exist. For instance, to challenge claims of rising literacy, one must show data. On literacy, government and survey data show significant improvement. J&K now often claims literacy rates above national average. That is not perfect, but contradicts blanket claims that Sadbhavana has had no effect.
5.3 Overemphasis on symbolic or superficial abuses
Some critiques highlight abuse or misgovernance to argue that the entire project is a cover. That conflation weakens genuine oversight. Criticism must be specific, documented, and linked to persons accountable. To say “goodwill means bad faith” without acknowledging where things worked reasonably well risks alienating populations that see benefit.
Case stories: concrete instances
To bring data alive, here are a few case studies / stories drawn from media reports:
Kupwara AGSs: Several AGS in Kupwara continue achieving 100% pass percentages in Class 10 exams; students in these schools also figure among the top in the Valley in board performance. In Krusan (Kupwara), AGS schools had 100% pass results and multiple distinctions.
Digital library and innovation under adversity: In the iPrep tablet scheme, even during lockdowns or school closures, students and teachers adapted: carrying tablets, continuing lessons outdoors, etc., reflecting both resourcefulness and the presence of preloaded content.
Dras school effort: AGS Dras, under newer interventions, is being developed into a "digital model school" with smartboards, interactive panels, etc., which is particularly significant in remote/high altitude districts where connectivity and infrastructure are challenging.
Financial sustainability MoUs: AGSs in Baramulla and Kupwara signed MoUs providing significant annual funding to ensure quality and continuity, e.g. Rs. 3.28 crore per year for certain schools for five years.
What we don’t yet have or what remains weak
While many specific claims in the critique are either exaggerated or lack public source verification, some concerns are valid:
The data on health outcomes (infant mortality, etc.) specific to Sadbhavana interventions is not always publicly available in peer reviewed or independent sources.
Clean water access improvements, or electrification, while reported, are often government or local administrative data; separation between Sadbhavana’s role and that of civil authorities or other NGOs is often ambiguous.
There are reports of inconsistent quality across AGSs: some are well resourced, others less so; some areas still suffer from teacher shortages, maladjusted curricula, infrastructure issues.
Also, the perception of militarised welfare is deeply rooted in some communities, especially where security operations have had negative effects; these perceptions cannot simply be dismissed—they need addressing via transparency, community engagement, and accountability.
Why Sadbhavana Matters: Beyond Numbers
Some of the more powerful effects are intangible but significant:
Hope and psychological safety: For many children in conflict areas, going to school is not just about learning; it’s about being visible, being part of a normal daily routine, feeling that authority is something that can protect and provide, not only punish.
Role models and alternative futures: Where conflict, militancy, unemployment loom large, seeing a peer pass exams, enter college, or start a small business can shift the imagination of what is possible. Children choosing education over enmity is among the quietest but most transformative indicators.
Stabilising communities: Where access to education, health, infrastructure improves, grievances that fuel disenchantment often weaken. While quantifying “reduced militancy due to Sadbhavana” is complicated, there is anecdotal indication that areas with more welfare presence see more cooperation with civil institutions.
Towards a more rigorous critique and stronger Sadbhavana
If we accept that Sadbhavana is neither wholly exemplary nor wholly deceptive, then the path forward lies in refining both the programme and its critique.
Better data collection, public reporting, independent evaluation: Third party evaluations (academia, civil society) should be encouraged and their results made public. Longitudinal studies tracking cohorts of students in AGSs vs comparable government schools could help.
Community ownership and local participation: Ensuring that the schools, health camps, etc., work not only for communities but with them. Local committees, parent‐teacher groups, tribal leadership involvement.
Addressing marginalised groups explicitly: Nomadic, tribal, non settled populations need flexible, adaptive strategies—mobile schooling, open schooling, night classes, multilingual instruction, etc.
Integration with civil infrastructure: Social welfare must not depend solely on military effort. Coordination with government health, education, rural development ministries must increase so that Sadbhavana complements rather than substitutes.
Transparent grievance redressal: Mechanisms must be in place—and known to all—to report failures, abuses, neglect. This builds trust, especially where perceptions of military overreach or neglect have alienated some.
Recognising complexity, embracing agency
To return to the core thesis: criticism is healthy. But when critique ignores what has materially changed, when it erases the agency and voice of children who can now go to AGSs, women who have started small businesses, or remote villages now connected by roads—critique does harm. It infantilizes people by suggesting only victims, never beneficiaries.
Yes, Operation Sadbhavana is not perfect. There are still gaps, inequalities, unavoidable trade offs between security and freedom, and areas where welfare delivery is weak or bureaucratic. But the evidence shows that over 25 years, Sadbhavana has produced real schools, real exam pass rates, real infrastructure, and real livelihoods.
If we care about democracy, justice, and security in J&K, we must hold Sadbhavana to high standards—and critique it—but also affirm where it has succeeded. Because for many in J&K, these are not abstract numbers. They are the access to education after years of interruption. They are the health care where there was none. They are the chance to envision a life beyond conflict.
