
At the heart of the opposition lies the claim that Sindh is already facing acute water shortages and environmental degradation due to upstream extractions. The impacts are not theoretical. The drying up of the Indus delta, salinization of coastal lands, the destruction of mangrove forests, the displacement of fishing communities, and the recurring water crises in urban centers such as Karachi and Hyderabad are tangible manifestations of a dwindling river. For many in Sindh, further diversions would amount to an ecological death sentence.
Pakistan's hydropolitics have long been entangled in tensions between its provinces, but few disputes have been as emotionally charged, historically rooted and politically consequential as the resistance emerging from Sindh over the proposed canal projects, most notably the controversial Chashma Right Bank Canal and others tied to the federal government's vision for agricultural expansion in Punjab and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As Pakistan grapples with climate stress, depleting water resources and demands of food security, the provincial dissent emanating from Sindh highlights a deep-seated mistrust of centralized water policymaking and a lingering fear of marginalization.
Sindh, Pakistan's second-largest province by population and the lower riparian in the Indus River System, has consistently voiced its grievances over what it perceives as inequitable water distribution. The Indus River, the lifeblood of Pakistan's agrarian economy, originates in Tibet and flows through India into Pakistan, finally reaching the Arabian Sea via Sindh. For centuries, the river has been the cultural, economic and agricultural backbone of Sindh. Any alteration in its flow, especially upstream diversion is seen as a threat to its identity and survival. The new canal projects, initiated with the stated goal of addressing food insecurity and expanding cultivated areas in other provinces, have met with sharp criticism from Sindhi civil society, political parties, farmer unions and water experts.
At the heart of the opposition lies the claim that Sindh is already facing acute water shortages and environmental degradation due to upstream extractions. The impacts are not theoretical. The drying up of the Indus delta, salinization of coastal lands, the destruction of mangrove forests, the displacement of fishing communities, and the recurring water crises in urban centers such as Karachi and Hyderabad are tangible manifestations of a dwindling river. For many in Sindh, further diversions would amount to an ecological death sentence.
The Chashma Right Bank Canal project is a key flashpoint. Although presented as a means to increase the arable land area in parts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, critics argue that its revival after being shelved for decades is a unilateral decision that ignores the foundational principles of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord. This accord, signed by all four provinces, was supposed to equitably allocate water resources and ensure that no province suffers unduly due to infrastructural changes made without consensus. Sindh’s leaders argue that the canal violates this accord and reflects a worrying trend in which Islamabad pursues mega-projects under the guise of development, without transparent consultations with or consent of the stakeholders most affected.
The Sindh Assembly has passed multiple resolutions against the canal project and even the Sindh cabinet, cutting across party lines, has expressed unanimity in opposing its construction. Street protests have been organized in cities and rural areas alike. Farmers, especially in districts such as Thatta, Badin and Sujawal, which are already witnessing water scarcity, fear that the new canal would divert more water upstream, leaving their lands barren and their livelihoods threatened. The symbolism of a shrinking Indus resonates deeply in Sindhi poetry, folklore and collective memory it is not just a river, but an existential pillar.
Adding complexity to the matter is the role of the federal government and the institutional asymmetry within Pakistan’s political structure. The Water and Power Development Authority, a powerful federal agency, is often seen in Sindh as acting with little regard for provincial autonomy. When the Water and Power Development Authority pushes for mega-infrastructure projects in upstream regions, Sindh perceives it as a continuation of a pattern where the benefits accrue to Punjab or federal entities, while the costs environmental, economic and social are disproportionately borne by Sindh. The opacity with which feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments and public consultations are carried out only deepens this suspicion.
The issue also has a legal and constitutional dimension. Article 155 of Pakistan’s Constitution deals with inter-provincial river water disputes and provides a mechanism for resolution through the Council of Common Interests. However, Sindh’s leadership has often claimed that the Council of Common Interests is either sidelined or outvoted in such decisions, rendering its mandate ineffective. The absence of trust in these constitutional bodies fuels a sense of disenfranchisement. Sindh’s argument is not just about water volume, but about federal equity, participatory governance and respect for provincial rights.
From an environmental standpoint, the resistance has gained support from independent water experts and climate scientists who argue that building new canals is not a sustainable solution. Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Its water storage capacity is far below global averages and its agricultural sector is wasteful, relying on flood irrigation methods. Instead of building new diversions, experts suggest modernizing the existing irrigation system, fixing leakages, lining canals, promoting water-efficient crops and adopting conservation strategies. These alternatives, however, lack the grandeur and political visibility that large-scale infrastructure projects offer.
Furthermore, there is an ethnic and linguistic undercurrent to the protest. Sindhi nationalists view the canal projects as an extension of what they describe as ‘internal colonialism,’ where the resources of smaller provinces are exploited to benefit dominant regions. Slogans such as “Sindh ka pani, Sindh ke liye” (Sindh’s water for Sindh) have become rallying cries in recent years, reflecting both a political stance and an emotional assertion of identity. The opposition, therefore is not merely administrative it is also cultural.
The politics surrounding the canal project have also spilled over into national forums. Leaders from Sindh, including those from the ruling Pakistan People’s Party, have raised the issue in the National Assembly and Senate, demanding that no development proceed without their consent. The Pakistan People’s Party, whose political heartland lies in Sindh, has had to balance its provincial responsibilities with its ambitions on the federal stage. While it has opposed the canal in Sindh, critics often question whether it will resist such projects with equal resolve when in coalition with federal parties that support them.
On the other hand, proponents of the canal projects argue that Pakistan needs to take bold steps to address its looming food crisis. With a population exceeding 240 million and growing, the argument goes, agricultural expansion into underutilized lands in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab is inevitable. They claim that all provinces should share the burden and benefit of development and that infrastructural inertia would leave Pakistan vulnerable to external shocks, including climate disasters and food inflation. For these proponents, the canal is not a political conspiracy but a strategic necessity.
Yet, this logic falls short in the eyes of many Sindhis, who point out that calls for national development have historically come at their expense. They cite examples such as the construction of the Tarbela and Mangla dams, which led to massive displacements and ecosystem changes, yet were decided upon with little input from affected communities. The experience of the 2010 and 2022 floods, which devastated parts of Sindh, further highlights how ill-conceived water management strategies can amplify natural disasters.
Internationally, Pakistan is bound by the Indus Waters Treaty with India, but internally, its provinces lack a robust dispute resolution mechanism. This discrepancy is glaring and unsustainable. As climate change accelerates glacial melt, alters rainfall patterns and increases variability in river flows, the need for cooperative water governance has never been more urgent. Ignoring Sindh's concerns or bulldozing its resistance through executive authority would not only deepen provincial fault lines but also endanger the long-term viability of Pakistan's federal structure.
The canal controversy in Sindh is a reminder that development cannot be imposed it must be negotiated, consented to and rooted in justice. Any solution must begin with trust-building: transparency in planning, equitable data-sharing on water flows, genuine public consultations and strengthening of constitutional forums like the Council of Common Interests. Without these, canal projects will continue to symbolize imbalance and hegemony rather than progress.
The resistance in Sindh to canal projects is more than a battle over water it is a struggle for fairness, recognition and autonomy. The debate encapsulates broader questions about Pakistan’s identity as a federation, the meaning of development and the ethics of resource distribution. In the face of environmental collapse and political strain, ignoring these cries for justice risks setting the stage for a larger crisis one not only of water, but of unity.
At the heart of the opposition lies the claim that Sindh is already facing acute water shortages and environmental degradation due to upstream extractions. The impacts are not theoretical. The drying up of the Indus delta, salinization of coastal lands, the destruction of mangrove forests, the displacement of fishing communities, and the recurring water crises in urban centers such as Karachi and Hyderabad are tangible manifestations of a dwindling river. For many in Sindh, further diversions would amount to an ecological death sentence.
Pakistan's hydropolitics have long been entangled in tensions between its provinces, but few disputes have been as emotionally charged, historically rooted and politically consequential as the resistance emerging from Sindh over the proposed canal projects, most notably the controversial Chashma Right Bank Canal and others tied to the federal government's vision for agricultural expansion in Punjab and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As Pakistan grapples with climate stress, depleting water resources and demands of food security, the provincial dissent emanating from Sindh highlights a deep-seated mistrust of centralized water policymaking and a lingering fear of marginalization.
Sindh, Pakistan's second-largest province by population and the lower riparian in the Indus River System, has consistently voiced its grievances over what it perceives as inequitable water distribution. The Indus River, the lifeblood of Pakistan's agrarian economy, originates in Tibet and flows through India into Pakistan, finally reaching the Arabian Sea via Sindh. For centuries, the river has been the cultural, economic and agricultural backbone of Sindh. Any alteration in its flow, especially upstream diversion is seen as a threat to its identity and survival. The new canal projects, initiated with the stated goal of addressing food insecurity and expanding cultivated areas in other provinces, have met with sharp criticism from Sindhi civil society, political parties, farmer unions and water experts.
At the heart of the opposition lies the claim that Sindh is already facing acute water shortages and environmental degradation due to upstream extractions. The impacts are not theoretical. The drying up of the Indus delta, salinization of coastal lands, the destruction of mangrove forests, the displacement of fishing communities, and the recurring water crises in urban centers such as Karachi and Hyderabad are tangible manifestations of a dwindling river. For many in Sindh, further diversions would amount to an ecological death sentence.
The Chashma Right Bank Canal project is a key flashpoint. Although presented as a means to increase the arable land area in parts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, critics argue that its revival after being shelved for decades is a unilateral decision that ignores the foundational principles of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord. This accord, signed by all four provinces, was supposed to equitably allocate water resources and ensure that no province suffers unduly due to infrastructural changes made without consensus. Sindh’s leaders argue that the canal violates this accord and reflects a worrying trend in which Islamabad pursues mega-projects under the guise of development, without transparent consultations with or consent of the stakeholders most affected.
The Sindh Assembly has passed multiple resolutions against the canal project and even the Sindh cabinet, cutting across party lines, has expressed unanimity in opposing its construction. Street protests have been organized in cities and rural areas alike. Farmers, especially in districts such as Thatta, Badin and Sujawal, which are already witnessing water scarcity, fear that the new canal would divert more water upstream, leaving their lands barren and their livelihoods threatened. The symbolism of a shrinking Indus resonates deeply in Sindhi poetry, folklore and collective memory it is not just a river, but an existential pillar.
Adding complexity to the matter is the role of the federal government and the institutional asymmetry within Pakistan’s political structure. The Water and Power Development Authority, a powerful federal agency, is often seen in Sindh as acting with little regard for provincial autonomy. When the Water and Power Development Authority pushes for mega-infrastructure projects in upstream regions, Sindh perceives it as a continuation of a pattern where the benefits accrue to Punjab or federal entities, while the costs environmental, economic and social are disproportionately borne by Sindh. The opacity with which feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments and public consultations are carried out only deepens this suspicion.
The issue also has a legal and constitutional dimension. Article 155 of Pakistan’s Constitution deals with inter-provincial river water disputes and provides a mechanism for resolution through the Council of Common Interests. However, Sindh’s leadership has often claimed that the Council of Common Interests is either sidelined or outvoted in such decisions, rendering its mandate ineffective. The absence of trust in these constitutional bodies fuels a sense of disenfranchisement. Sindh’s argument is not just about water volume, but about federal equity, participatory governance and respect for provincial rights.
From an environmental standpoint, the resistance has gained support from independent water experts and climate scientists who argue that building new canals is not a sustainable solution. Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Its water storage capacity is far below global averages and its agricultural sector is wasteful, relying on flood irrigation methods. Instead of building new diversions, experts suggest modernizing the existing irrigation system, fixing leakages, lining canals, promoting water-efficient crops and adopting conservation strategies. These alternatives, however, lack the grandeur and political visibility that large-scale infrastructure projects offer.
Furthermore, there is an ethnic and linguistic undercurrent to the protest. Sindhi nationalists view the canal projects as an extension of what they describe as ‘internal colonialism,’ where the resources of smaller provinces are exploited to benefit dominant regions. Slogans such as “Sindh ka pani, Sindh ke liye” (Sindh’s water for Sindh) have become rallying cries in recent years, reflecting both a political stance and an emotional assertion of identity. The opposition, therefore is not merely administrative it is also cultural.
The politics surrounding the canal project have also spilled over into national forums. Leaders from Sindh, including those from the ruling Pakistan People’s Party, have raised the issue in the National Assembly and Senate, demanding that no development proceed without their consent. The Pakistan People’s Party, whose political heartland lies in Sindh, has had to balance its provincial responsibilities with its ambitions on the federal stage. While it has opposed the canal in Sindh, critics often question whether it will resist such projects with equal resolve when in coalition with federal parties that support them.
On the other hand, proponents of the canal projects argue that Pakistan needs to take bold steps to address its looming food crisis. With a population exceeding 240 million and growing, the argument goes, agricultural expansion into underutilized lands in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab is inevitable. They claim that all provinces should share the burden and benefit of development and that infrastructural inertia would leave Pakistan vulnerable to external shocks, including climate disasters and food inflation. For these proponents, the canal is not a political conspiracy but a strategic necessity.
Yet, this logic falls short in the eyes of many Sindhis, who point out that calls for national development have historically come at their expense. They cite examples such as the construction of the Tarbela and Mangla dams, which led to massive displacements and ecosystem changes, yet were decided upon with little input from affected communities. The experience of the 2010 and 2022 floods, which devastated parts of Sindh, further highlights how ill-conceived water management strategies can amplify natural disasters.
Internationally, Pakistan is bound by the Indus Waters Treaty with India, but internally, its provinces lack a robust dispute resolution mechanism. This discrepancy is glaring and unsustainable. As climate change accelerates glacial melt, alters rainfall patterns and increases variability in river flows, the need for cooperative water governance has never been more urgent. Ignoring Sindh's concerns or bulldozing its resistance through executive authority would not only deepen provincial fault lines but also endanger the long-term viability of Pakistan's federal structure.
The canal controversy in Sindh is a reminder that development cannot be imposed it must be negotiated, consented to and rooted in justice. Any solution must begin with trust-building: transparency in planning, equitable data-sharing on water flows, genuine public consultations and strengthening of constitutional forums like the Council of Common Interests. Without these, canal projects will continue to symbolize imbalance and hegemony rather than progress.
The resistance in Sindh to canal projects is more than a battle over water it is a struggle for fairness, recognition and autonomy. The debate encapsulates broader questions about Pakistan’s identity as a federation, the meaning of development and the ethics of resource distribution. In the face of environmental collapse and political strain, ignoring these cries for justice risks setting the stage for a larger crisis one not only of water, but of unity.
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