As the five judge bench of Supreme Court of India unanimously upheld the decision of the Government of India on abrogation of Article 370 in December 2023, it is crucial to examine one of the most striking paradoxes in Pakistan's stance on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) - the consistent call for a plebiscite coupled with persistent rejections when specific proposals were presented. While supporters and critics mark this landmark decision of the Supreme Court of India, it is essential to unravel the historical intricacies that have shaped Pakistan's narrative on the Kashmir issue. The inconsistency dates back to the early days of independence, as documented in Alan Campbell Johnson's memoir, "Mission with Mountbatten." In 1947, Louis Mountbatten proposed an UN-supervised plebiscite to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the governor-general of Pakistan. However, Jinnah suggested a bilateral plebiscite organized by the two governors-general, a proposition Mountbatten declined. This early rejection set the tone for Pakistan's approach to the plebiscite issue. Jinnah's rejection of an UN-supervised plebiscite in 1947 stands in stark contrast to the subsequent narrative developed by Pakistan. The marauding tribal raiders led by Pakistan Army, wrought havoc in Kashmir, engaging in looting, killing and perpetrating atrocities against both Hindus and Muslims. This violent episode raises doubts about Pakistan's genuine commitment to a democratic process and the belief that the outcome of a fair vote would have favoured the country. The invasion by tribal forces, backed by Pakistan, not only violated the principles of self-determination but also undermined the very idea of a plebiscite. The widespread violence and human rights abuses during this period, further cast a shadow over the credibility of any democratic exercise in the region.

As we turn the pages of history and unravel the events in August 1948, we get a glimpse of the chapter wherein the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal of all forces by Pakistan and a plebiscite. Remember the sequence as specified in this resolution as it is pertinent that withdrawal of forces by Pakistan is before that of plebiscite. Pakistan's foreign minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan, outlined two solutions in response, both conveniently avoiding the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. This preference for maintaining control over occupied territory overshadowed any commitment to a genuine plebiscite. The paradox deepened in 1950 when UN mediator Owen Dixon proposed a regional plebiscite limited to the Kashmir Valley. India was willing to consider it, but Pakistan rejected the idea, insisting on a single plebiscite. However, a revelation in Dixon's report exposed Pakistan's willingness to compromise on this principle, accepting a regional plebiscite if it meant gaining control over the Valley without a vote. However, one must remember that in April 1949 Pakistan had intentionally changed the territorial status quo of PIOK without holding any plebiscite. Pakistan under a secret Karachi Agreement brought the Northern Areas, duly renaming them as Gilgit-Baltistan, under its direct administrative control. One must remember that Northern Areas account for 85% of PIOK. Then in 1963 it went on to deal the worst blow to PIOK by ceding Shaksgam valley, spread over 5,200 square km of territory, to China.
In 1953, during prime ministerial-level talks, a joint communiqué, included provisions for a plebiscite. Yet, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's representative, rejected the regional plebiscite, echoing the same rationale as in 1950. This rejection came months before India closed the chapter in 1954. The consistent rejection of plebiscite proposals can be traced to domestic issues within Pakistan. In 1950, the sacking of Sardar Ibrahim Khan triggered the Sudhan revolt, forcing the Pakistani army to suppress rebellion. Subsequent complaints about martial law, random firings and human rights abuses in Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK) further demonstrated Pakistan's inability to afford a plebiscite under such circumstances.
Even in more recent history, leaders like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto acknowledged the jeopardy of the right to self-determination in J&K. Pakistan's preference for the use of force in successive wars, coupled with strategic territorial changes without plebiscites, exposes the underlying motivations that go beyond the rhetoric of self-determination. With the 13th amendment to Pakistan Illegally Occupied Kashmir’s (PIOK) constitution in 2018, Pakistan assumed direct authority over key subjects, rendering the plebiscite irrelevant. The territorial status quo has been altered and Pakistan's game in the Kashmir narrative is up. As we reflect on the past, it becomes evident that Pakistan's commitment to a plebiscite was contingent on maintaining control, rather than ensuring the democratic will of the Kashmiri people.
In the grand tapestry of Kashmir's complex history, the paradox of Pakistan's stance on the plebiscite issue reveals a consistent pattern of prioritizing strategic gains over the democratic aspirations of the people it claims to champion. The rejection of plebiscite proposals, intertwined with territorial ambitions and internal unrest, paints a nuanced picture of geopolitical manoeuvring rather than a genuine commitment to the principles of self-determination. One cannot ignore the diplomatic intricacies and the geopolitical context that shaped these decisions. Pakistan's rejection of an UN-supervised plebiscite in 1947 and subsequent reluctance to withdraw its armed forces in 1948 underscored a strategic desire to secure control over the region, rather than adhering to the principles specified by international bodies from time to time. The revelation of Pakistan's willingness to compromise on the principle of a single plebiscite, as exposed in Owen Dixon's report in 1950, adds another layer to the narrative. The readiness to accept a regional plebiscite if it meant gaining control over the Kashmir Valley without a comprehensive vote speaks volumes about the pragmatism underlying Pakistan's approach..
As the region continues to be a flashpoint in Asia, understanding the nuances of these historical choices is imperative as reports from the PIOK reveal a region in turmoil, with the local population expressing unrest and dissatisfaction. Protests have erupted against the perceived denial of basic human rights and the heavy-handed approach of the Pakistan Army, accused of forcefully pursuing business ventures at the expense of the local populace. In addition to these grievances, the region grapples with a complex political landscape, experiencing limited autonomy within the Pakistani federal framework. Political leadership appointed by Islamabad has led to a perceived lack of representation for the local populace. A similar situation is observed in Gilgit-Baltistan, strategically important but not constitutionally recognized as part of Pakistan, administered by the federal government. Discontent among locals regarding proper representation and constitutional rights further adds to the region's turmoil. Human rights concerns compound the challenges faced by the people of entire PIOK. Reports of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of expression have raised alarms. Allegations of human rights abuses are often directed at both state and non-state actors, creating an environment of fear and mistrust among the local population. The lack of transparency and curtailed freedom of the press make it difficult for accurate information to reach the wider world, exacerbating the challenges faced by the region. Terrorism and anarchy purported by ISI is another factor contributing to the turmoil in the region.
We can safely assume that the paradox persisted through the decades, with leaders like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto openly acknowledging the jeopardy of the right to self-determination. The preference for force in successive wars and the alteration of territorial status without plebiscites underscores a strategic calculus that prioritizes control over democratic processes. As the 13th amendment to POK's constitution in 2018 granted Pakistan direct legislative and executive authority over key subjects, the plebiscite lost its relevance. The altered constitutional landscape solidified Pakistan's grip on the region, making the rhetoric of self-determination a mere facade. In the current geopolitical landscape, with the game exposed, it is crucial to re-evaluate the historical inconsistencies in Pakistan's Kashmir narrative. The paradox of advocating for a plebiscite while consistently rejecting specific proposals reveals a complex tapestry of geopolitical ambitions, internal challenges and strategic manoeuvring.